PDF《CHINA'S MYANMAR DILEMMA》

s political and commercial position in Burma/ Myanmar1 is in large part a consequence of decisions made in Western capitals. Confronting a comprehensive set of economic and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union, as well as the suspension of new development assistance by Japan in 1988,2 Myanmar sought stronger relations with its neighbours. Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win had begun working to improve diplomatic relations with China in October

1970 and vis- ited Beijing the following August, but it was not until years later that ties improved. Border trade officially opened in 1988. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which China had supported, collapsed in March 1989, around the same time that democracy movements in both countries were followed by harsh crackdowns and West- ern condemnation. Relations warmed considerably. China, which had just entered a period of economic reform and development, readily expanded its stake in Myanmar. The benefits were almost immediate for Myanmar. China'

s economic, military and political support was a lifeline for the military government.3 Disastrous nationalisation

1 This report uses the name Myanmar, in line with the practice of the UN and most countries outside North America and Europe. This is not a political statement or a judgment on the right of the military regime to change the name of the country.

2 Up to

1988 Japan had been the main foreign aid donor to Myanmar, making up

78 per cent of Myanmar'

s overseas de- velopment assistance (ODA). Following that year'

s military coup and crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, Japan suspended all assistance, except for a small amount of hu- manitarian aid and projects that had been previously agreed upon. Even so, Japan continues to be among the largest do- nors. Toshihiro Kudo, Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged , Institute of Developing Economies, dis- cussion paper no. 118, August 2007, at www.ide.go.jp/ English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/118.pdf;

Patrick Strefford, Japanese ODA diplomacy towards Myanmar: A Test for the ODA Charter , Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, vol.

6 (2007), pp. 65-77, at www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/ cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.6/04Patrick%20Strefford.pdf.

3 The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is the official name of the government, which until 1997, was known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). policies had turned Myanmar into one of the world'

s most impoverished countries, and it relied increasingly on trade, investment and aid from China. China also pro- vided military assistance, beginning in 1989, at a time when few others were willing to supply arms. China'

s value to Myanmar has only increased with its rise as a regional power. As Myanmar'

s strongest supporter, China'

s backing for any international strategy to promote positive change is vital, but there are important limits to China'

s influence over Myanmar and to how it is willing to exert pressure. This report examines the drivers of Chinese national and provincial policy towards Myanmar and its impli- cations for international approaches toward the country. In so doing, it explains how Chinese authorities manage the relationship with the Myanmar government, ethnic groups and opposition;

and analyses limits on Chinese influence. The report does not present a general frame- work for international policy on Myanmar, which was the subject of an earlier Crisis Group report.4 This report is based on interviews conducted on both sides of the China-Myanmar border, from Thailand on the Thai-Myanmar border, as well as in Yangon, Mandalay, Kunming, New Delhi, Bangkok, Geneva, New York and Washington DC. Crisis Group spoke to a wide range