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5 January 19,

2012 Congress and Obama'

s China Policy, More Bark than Bite Robert Sutter [[email protected]] is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington DC. The 112th Congress will complete its term in

2012 marked by strong opposition to policies of President Barack Obama on government debt, budget cuts, health care, and other issues. Adding to congressional-executive gridlock has been an upswing in congressional criticism of China'

s policies, resulting in legislation in the Senate and the House challenging the administration'

s efforts to sustain moderate policies toward China over currency manipulation, trade disputes, and arms sales and other support for Taiwan. The congressional activism feeds into the echo chamber of often strident anti-China rhetoric by many candidates seeking the Republican presidential nomination. Nevertheless, forecasts of congressional trouble for the president'

s China policy are offset by closer examination of the congressional actions and of US interests supporting and opposing tougher policies toward China. Congress remains preoccupied with other issues and is ambivalent about reasserting its role in foreign affairs and China policy. Conflicting interests in the US advocating or opposing tougher congressional action on China indicate that the overall effect of recent congressional activism will not upset the president'

s policies. It will prompt some vocal debate and will impede forward movement in US-China relations. Episodic Congressional Influence on China Policy Since the US opening to China, Congress has voiced opposition to the administration'

s China policy on several occasions, but has taken substantive action only episodically. The struggles between the administration and congressional opposition over breaking relations with Taiwan and the perceived use of the China card against the Soviet Union became intense and lasted for several years during the Jimmy Carter and early Ronald Reagan administrations, with both sides firmly committed to conflicting agendas. At the time, the debate was strongly influenced by widespread congressional efforts to reassert the role of Congress in the making of US foreign policy. One result was the Taiwan Relations Act which has influenced US policy toward China ever since. Congress also was in the lead among domestic US forces opposing China and supporting Taiwan after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989. However, congressional support for these policies proved thin and fickle by the mid-1990s in the face of serious adverse consequences posed notably by China'

s strong and increasingly powerful opposition. On balance, the commitments of congressional opponents to administration China policy were significantly weaker in the 1990s than in the late 1970s-early 1980s. Congressional opposition to the president'

s China policy dropped off markedly with the election of George W. Bush and a Republican-controlled Congress. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the overall war on terror saw Congress defer to the president in foreign affairs, including China policy, to such a degree that scholars said congressional inaction undermined the checks and balances in the US Constitution. Democratic control of the 110th and 111th Congresses under the leadership of well-known China critics House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid saw some revived debate over China policy, but little substantive action at odds with the president'