PDF《博士学位论文公示材料》

combination explosion upon the procurement effect, was analyzed. Secondly, a two-round bundle -combination based auction mechanism was designed and the bundle optimization problem and the winner determination problem were proposed due to their importance in this two-round auction. Finally, the detailed models and algorithms of these two optimization problems were discussed and studied and the relevant simulation experiments validated the effectiveness of the proposed models and algorithms (3) The second major research work was to investigate a two-round reverse auction mechanism for single separable items. Firstly, a one-round reverse auction mechanism was presented and its difficult issue in the implement steps, that is, the mismatch problem of demand and supply, was analyzed. Secondly, a two-round division-based reverse auction mechanism was designed and the division optimization problem and the winner determination problem, which were two important optimization problems in this way of two-round auction, were proposed. Finally, these two optimization problems were studied in detail from two aspects of building model and designing algorithm. ―3― (4) The final major research work was to investigate a two-round procurement mechanism for multiple separable items based on auction plus negotiation. Firstly, a reverse auction based procurement mechanism was presented and the winner determination problem in this traditional auction was studied;

in particular, two different mathematical models was built with different objective functions of minimizing total procurement cost and maximizing total procurement save respectively, and a genetic algorithm was designed for optimizing the proposed models. Secondly, a two-round auction and negotiation based procurement mechanism was designed to deal with the difficult issue of the traditional one-round auction based........